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A vast literature has emerged using Taylor rules to analyze monetary policy. Although
very attractive both theoretically and empirically, such rules imply a mechanical response
by the policy variable to fundamental ones.
This study looks for empirical evidence of a more sophisticated monetary policy, one
which takes into account expected future developments. An important piece of information
I use is the Greenbook forecast series, which are calculated by the Federal Reserve Board’s
Research Department prior to the Board meetings.
Using Greenbook forecasts allows calculation of future inﬂa t i o ns h o c k sa se x p e c t e db yt h e
Fed. These shocks are signiﬁcant in the estimated Taylor rule, conﬁrming that policymaking
is forward-looking.
In addition, using Greenbook forecasts allows one to obtain better real time estimates of
the potential output, and thus to obtain a more precise characterization of monetary policy.
Keywords: Monetary policy, Taylor rule, real time data.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E58.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It seems intuitively clear that policy making should be preemptive and should anticipate
future developments. There has been much theoretical discussion recently in the economic
literature describing monetary policy as being forward looking. At the same time not much
empirical evidence of forward-looking policy has been provided.
Most studies assume that monetary policy rules respond to developments that have al-
ready taken place, since they use lagged fundamentals. This is based on the idea that a very
high degree of inertia in variables such as inﬂation and output makes lags powerful predictors
of leads. Such policy is however, overly ”mechanical”; to paraphrase Vladimir Lenin (1917),
it gives the impression that even ”a cook can run the Federal Reserve”.
In this paper I argue that policy making is indeed forward-looking. Such a statement
however, leaves room for various interpretations.
Most of the research in this direction assumes that monetary policy is forward-looking in
the sense that it aims at the public’s expectations, which in turn, agect contemporaneous
fundamentals. Yet such a policy may still be mechanical. Lansing and Trehan (2001), for
instance, develop a model where fundamentals are driven both by inertia and expectations,
but where the optimal rule is nevertheless lag based, thus assuming a mechanical backward
response.
Monetary policy can also be considered forward-looking in the sense that it responds
to shocks, of which policy makers have some information. These shocks can be of various
natures. They may reﬂect unusually bad or good harvests, changes in the world price of oil
1or gold, etc. Finally they may reﬂect public expectations, even if these expectations are not
driven by fundamentals.
Thus, these two types of forward-looking models are not inherently digerent, but they are
not necessarily the same either. In an environment with rational expectations and without
private information, these two approaches would depict the same picture. However, if policy
makers have access to information which is not readily available to the general public, then
responding to public expectations may not prove to be ec i e n t .R o m e ra n dR o m e r( 2 0 0 0 )
provide an evidence of such asymmetry in information available to public and the Fed.
In this study, I am providing statistical evidence of a policy, which is forward-looking
in the sense that it responds to shocks, whether they are expected by the public or not.
These shocks are calculated based on the Greenbook forecasts of inﬂation and output, and
thus represent the Fed’s expectations. They are signiﬁcant statistically present in the policy
rule, conﬁrming that policy makers take into account future developments, and that policy
is more preemptive than a simple response to ”inertial” components would suggest.
The gain of using the Greenbook forecasts is twofold. First, it allows testing for the rule’s
”direction”. Second, the use of forecasts allows one to calculate more precisely the real-time
estimates of lagged potential output which policy makers had at hand.
Most authors use ex post estimates of output gap, obtained by detrending the revised
data for output. Tchaidze (2001) uses a more realistic speciﬁcation of output gap, which is
based on preliminary estimates of actual output and using only its lagged observations for
estimating the economy’s potential level. This paper constitutes one more step toward an
2even more realistic analysis by including the Greenbook forecasts into information set based
on which output gap estimates are calculated.
The paper contains 4 sections. Section 2 estimates backward-looking rules using digerent
estimates of the lagged output gap, starting with a commonly used speciﬁcation, which is
based on both lags and leads of output, and proceeding to more realistic ones, which are
based ﬁrst on lags only and then on lags and forecasts that reﬂect additional information
policy makers have. Section 3 uses a simple model to derive a forward-looking rule, one
which responds to inertial components of inﬂation and output gap as well as to expected
shocks, and then discusses empirical results. Among other results, it argues that the inﬂation
response coecient is higher than the usually suggested values, and is about 2.5. Section 4
provides some historical evidence justifying the behavior of the Fed in a way suggested by
the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Re-estimating Lag Based Rules
In this section I estimate a backward-looking Taylor rule which responds only to movements
in lagged fundamentals. The backward-looking speciﬁcation of a Taylor rule looks as follows:
it = C + C1Zt31 + C2yt31
where i is an overnight interest rate set by the Fed (also known as the Federal Funds Rate),
Z is inﬂation, measured as an annual growth of the GNP/GDP deﬂator1,a n dy is the output
1Until 1993, GNP rather than GDP was used as a main indicator of national output. This switch is not
expected to have any major impact on the results.
3gap, measured as a digerence between log-output and its trend. The rule is based on lagged
fundamentals, as contemporaneous ones have not yet been realized and lagged observations
are the most up-to-date pieces of information available to policy makers. All the data are
quarterly. The sample2 runs from 1987:3 to 1994:4.
In sub-section 2.1 I compare digerent estimates of the output gap trying to achieve the
most realistic picture of an environment in which policy makers take decisions, while in
sub-section 2.2 I estimate the rule.
2.1 3 Sets of Output Gap Estimates
Iu s et h r e ed i gerent sets of estimates of fundamentals. The ﬁrst may be considered as ex
post, the two others as real-time. The main digerence between them is the way output gap
estimates are constructed.
The very ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the rule uses 1999 vintage data for inﬂation and output
levels. Most of these data (particularly its earlier components) have been substantially
revised since their initial releases. For this particular speciﬁcation I use estimates of output
gap, which I call ”Lags and Leads”. I detrend the whole path for log-output (1947:1 — 1999:2)
using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
It is well known that for most of the univariate detrending techniques (linear, quadratic,
HP) as well as for multivariate ones, calculating a trend at any point in time t very much
depends not only on lagged observations, but also on lead ones. Had the economy evolved
2I start my sample in 1987:3 as it is the ﬁrst quarter of Greenspan’s chairmanship. I end my sample in
1994 because Greenbook forecasts for later observations were not available to me (see further).
4digerently after t, trend estimates would have been digerent.
Imagine that after a long period of growth, output declines over one or two consecutive
periods. At this point, one cannot make a straightforward conclusion — whether a decline
is a temporary correction, which will be followed by a further growth, or is the signal of a
business cycle’s turning point. Only after observing output over several more periods can
one tell exactly what is happening, as this then allows for a more precise estimate of the
trend at a point of interest t. Orphanides and Van Norden (1999) cite lack of information
about an economy’s future developments as a main cause of errors in real-time estimates of
the gap.
Thus, the second speciﬁcation of output gap is ”Lags Only”. For every point in time t,I
detrend lagged observations of the output levels, from 1947:1 till t  1. Thus, the estimates
are obtained using one-sided Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Also, the inﬂation and output data that
I use are unrevised, as reported in the Philadelphia Fed’s real-time web dataset (for details
see Croushore and Stark, 1999). The exclusion of leads of the data and ignoring revisions
have a drastic egect on output gap estimates. An error term (deﬁned as the digerence
between ex post — ”Lags and Leads” and real-time — ”Lags Only” estimates of output gap)
ranges from 1.54 to 3.33, with a mean of 0.53, and a standard deviation of 1.45 (see table
1). Tchaidze (2001) argues that most of these errors should be attributed to the exclusion
of leads rather than to revisions.
Although the data released in various statistical bulletins do not suggest much about
further developments in the economy, policy makers undoubtedly know more. Even though
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Table 1: Errors in Real-Time Estimates of Output Gap
they do not observe the leads of output and cannot make correct estimations of the trend
based on observed values, they may be observing other signals which indicate approximate
values of the trend and the direction which it is going to follow. Although over longer horizons
these estimates become less and less precise, policy makers gain additional leverage, as they
can inﬂuence future developments through the setting of policy variables.
To account for these factors, I construct the third set of estimates called ”Lags and
Forecasts”. At every point in time t, I detrend time series which consists of observed lagged
values (from 1947:1 till t  1) and the forecasts for the contemporaneous as well as the four
following quarters (from t till t+4). Detrending such series allows me to construct estimates
which are closer to the ones that policy makers used.
To construct forecasts of output, I use forecasts of output growth as reported in the
”Current Economic and Financial Conditions” issues, also known as ”the Greenbook”. The
Greenbook is a collection of various data that are prepared by the economists at the Federal
Reserve Board, and are presented to the Board of the Governors before their regular meetings
(the Board usually meets eight times a year).
For security reasons, the Greenbook data become publicly available with a ﬁve-year lag.
Note that data are not really forecasts in the sense that they do not reﬂect the policy that
6is being implemented but rather assumptions of the economists about future policy and
shocks. Obviously, had a digerent set of assumptions been made, the forecasts would have
been digerent. However, since at the very short horizons, policy has a very small egect if
any at all, I can assume that only the forecasts for t +3a n dt + 4 are not invariant with
respect to the assumptions about the future policy.
As table 1 indicates, the inclusion of forecasts signiﬁcantly improves real-time gap esti-
mates. Both mean and standard deviation of the error term are about half of what they
were before. Maximum and minimum values are much smaller in absolute terms as well.
Figure 1 also shows that most of the time the ”Lags and Forecasts” estimates lie between
the ”Lags and Leads” and the ”Lags Only” estimates, indicating an obvious improvement
in estimation results.
2.2 Estimating the Rule
Since the ”Lags and Forecasts” output gap estimates are much closer to the ex post ”Lags and
Leads” estimates than the estimates which are based on lags only, it should not be surprising
that the digerence between ex post and real-time estimates of Taylor rule diminishes as well
once the ”Lags and Forecasts” gap estimates are used rather than the ones based on ”Lags
Only” (see table 2). Not only is the digerence between the values of response coecient
estimates smaller, the digerence in ﬁt practically disappears3.
The results still suggest a very strong inﬂation response of 2.33, which is higher than the
3The dierences between estimates are also caused by the revisions. As mentioned earlier, the ”Lags and
Leads” speciﬁcation uses revised data, while the other two use unrevised data. Tchaidze (2001) shows that
accounting for revisions for this particular sub-sample is an important factor.
7LINFL LGAP CNST ¯ R2 SSR
Lags and Leads 1.58 1.25 0.32 0.87 19.88
(0.31) (0.13) (1.05)
Lags and Forecasts 2.33 1.02 -1.39 0.84 24.58
(0.23) (0.14) (0.94)
Lags Only 2.90 0.83 -2.97 0.75 38.01
(0.27) (0.17) (1.11)
Table 2: Rules with Various Output Gap Speciﬁcations.
values usually suggested (1.4 — 2.0, see Rudebusch, 2000) and a strong output gap response
of 1.02 leaning to the right end of the usually suggested range (0.5 — 1.0, see Rudebusch,
2000)
It is important to note that even though ﬁts for the ”Lags and Leads” and ”Lags and
Forecasts” regressions are almost identical, there is a digerence in the values of the estimated
coecients. The values for the ”Lags and Leads” speciﬁcation are very similar to the sug-
gested ones4 of 1.5, 1 and 1. The values for the ”Lags and Forecasts” speciﬁcations are
digerent.
Testing whether coecients in the ”Lags and Forecasts” speciﬁcation are equal to the ones
suggested by the ”Lags and Leads” speciﬁcation provides the following results: one cannot
reject a hypothesis that an output gap coecient for the ”Lags and Forecasts” speciﬁcation
is equal to 1.25, the value suggested by the ”Lags and Leads” speciﬁcation, but one rejects
the hypothesis CZ =1 .58 at a 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. Likewise one rejects a hypothesis
C =0 .32, CZ =1 .58 and Cy =1 .25 at 0.05 signiﬁcance level as well.
4The rule suggested by Taylor (1993) originally had an inﬂation coecient of 1.5, output gap coecient
of 0.5 and a constant term of 1. Several studies have suggested however a stronger response to output gap
(Ball 1999, Williams, 1999).
8Thus, even though for all of the parameters conﬁdence intervals5 in the ”Lags and Leads”
and ”Lags and Forecasts” regressions have a non-empty intersection, the tests indicate that
there is a substantial digerence between the two, and in particular, that the inﬂation coe-
cient is much higher than 1.5.
3F o r w a r d - l o o k i n g R u l e s
This section estimates a forward-looking speciﬁcation of the rule, one which responds to
movements in expected rather than lagged variables. Sub-section 3.1 uses a simple model of
a closed economy to provide a theoretical basis for such a rule, while sub-section 3.2 discusses
results of estimation.
3.1 Theoretical Model
To describe the economy, I use a model which has become a somewhat standard tool for such
purposes (see Romer, 2001). The annual model was proposed by Ball (1999) and Svensson
(1997). Orphanides (1998b) develops a similar semi-annual model, while Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) derive an analogous model formulated in quarterly terms.
The model consists of the two following equations:
(Zt+1  Z
W)=( Zt  Z
W)+kyt + 0t+1 (1)
yt+1 = byt  q (rt  r
W)+#t+1 (2)
5All the estimations in this paper are being done with an OLS/Newey-West procedure, thus accounting
standard errors for possible heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
9w h e r eap e r i o di so n ey e a r ,rt is a real interest rate set by policy makers, Zt and yt refer to
the newest information available to them before making a decision, and ZW and rW refer to
the respective long-run levels of inﬂation and real interest rate.
Equation (1) is an accelerationist Phillip’s curve. Equation (2) is an IS curve, assuming
an inertial output gap, which is agected by a real interest rate rt. Finally, 0t+1 and #t+1 are
zero mean, normally distributed random variables, reﬂecting supply and demand shocks.
Note that the model is completely backward-looking, and thus, implicitly assumes adap-
tive expectations. It is a common observation that alternative frameworks, assuming rational
expectations, do not ﬁt observed data as well unless there are some agents that are backward-
looking to some degree (e.g. Ball 2000, Fuhrer 1997, Roberts, 1997 and 1998).
The model assumes that policy makers can agect inﬂa t i o no n l yw i t h i nt w op e r i o d s ,a s
monetary policy has an ege c to no u t p u tg a pw i t hao n ep e r i o dl a g ,a n do u t p u tg a pa gects
inﬂation with a one period lag as well. This means that when policy makers are designing
monetary policy by setting an instrument variable rt, they treat expected inﬂation EtZt+1
as given. Furthermore, as equation (2) shows, setting interest rate is tantamount to setting
expected output gap — for any given Etyt+1 one can ﬁnd rt such that expected output gap
next period will be equal to Etyt+1.
I assume that policy makers are minimizing a weighted sum of inﬂation and output gap
variances. As Romer (2001) shows, such an objective implies a linear response function of
the following form
Etyt+1 = qEt (Zt+1  Z
W)( 3 )
10where q is a parameter, determined by the weights that policy makers assign to inﬂation and
output gap variances. Higher q is associated with a higher weight being placed on inﬂation
variance, while lower q is associated with a higher weight being put on output gap variance.
Equation (3) shows that whenever policy makers expect inﬂation to be above its long-run
level, they contract the economy in order to prevent it from overheating. At the same time,
whenever inﬂa t i o ni se x p e c t e dt ob eb e l o wi t sl o n g - r u nl e v e l ,t h e yl o o s e nu pa n dp u s ht h e
output above its potential level.
While the previous authors assumed that shocks 0 and # are completely unforecastable,
I assume that policy makers do have some information about them. In particular, although
unconditional expectations E0t+1 and E#t+1 are zero, policy makers’ expectations Et0t+1
and Et#t+1 as of time t are not necessarily so.
Substituting equations (1) and (2) into (3), I can solve for the interest rate in terms of
lagged output gap and inﬂation, as well as expected output gap and inﬂation shocks:
byt + Et#t+1  q (rt  r
W)=q(Zt  Z
W + kyt + Et0t+1)
q (rt  r
W)=byt + Et#t+1 + q(Zt  Z
W)+qkyt + qEt0t+1
rt = r
W + CZ (Zt  Z
W)+Cyyt + CZEt0t+1 + q
31Et#t+1
where CZ = q/q and Cy =( b + qk)/q. This formulation suggests that the more anti-
inﬂationary the preferences of policy makers, the more aggressive is the corresponding policy
in response to deviations in both inﬂation and output gap lags.
Reformulating the rule in terms of a nominal rather than a real interest rate, results in:
it =( r
W  CZZ
W)+( 1+CZ)Zt + Cyyt + CZEt0t+1 + q
31Et#t+1 (4)
11Note that the policy makers respond to ”inertial” variables — Zt and yt as well as expected
shocks Et0t+1 and Et#t+1.
Unfortunately, not all of these variables are readily available when it comes to empirical
estimations, in particular, ones reﬂecting expectations. The Greenbook does provide data
on output growth and inﬂation forecasts, and at ﬁrst glance, these might seem sucient to
solve the problem. However, the issue is more delicate.
Since inﬂa t i o ni sp r e d e t e r m i n e df o ro n ep e r i o da h e a da n dd o e sn o td e p e n do nt h ei n t e r e s t
rate, I can use equation (1) by substituting the Greenbook forecasts in place of expected
inﬂation EtZ+1 and treat residuals as the expected inﬂation shock Et0+1:
EtZt+1 = Zt + kyt + Et0t+1
At the same time, as equation (2) demonstrates, expected output shock Et#+1 cannot be
recovered, as it depends on the assumed values of the interest rate which are not observed.
As already mentioned, the Greenbook forecasts are calculated before the Board makes a
decision, and thus are not based on the true value of the policy instrument. They do not
reﬂect implemented policy in the same manner as forecasts produced by the Bank of England
or the Bank of Canada do.
The path for the interest rate assumed in these forecasts is suggested by the director
of the Research Department (Michael Prell for the period covered). Very often, alternative
forecasts are produced as well, and these are sometimes (though not always) included in the
Greenbook. Over the course of a forecast exercise, the suggested path may well be revised
if the stag (or their models) suggest that the path is unlikely to actually be realized in the
12economy.
Finally, apart from models, economists also use their own judgement when calculating
forecasts, suggesting that these forecasts are highly subjective and do not necessarily reﬂect
the Board’s opinions.
As mentioned earlier, the main question of interest in this study is whether the rule
is forward-looking — i.e. takes into account expected shocks — or purely mechanical — i.e.
simply uses lags of the fundamentals. If these shocks are not directly included among the
regressors, such a rule can be mistaken for a mechanical backward-looking one. However,
when estimated as such, one implication would be a lower ﬁt and a bigger sum of squared
residuals.
Thus, estimating a lag based rule, both with and without inclusion of expected inﬂation
shock, and comparing sums of squared residuals should indeed demonstrate whether ”a cook
can run the Federal Reserve” or not.
In addition to that, the model implies that the coecients for lagged inﬂation and ex-
pected inﬂation shock should satisfy a restriction imposed by equation (4) — the digerence
between them should be equal to 1. Testing this hypothesis would provide another way of
testing whether policy making is forward looking or not.
3.2 Empirical Results
This sub-section presents empirical results. Since the data that I use is quarterly, the no-
tations are slightly digerent from those in section 3.1. In particular, the newest pieces of
13information that are observed by policy makers are lagged quarterly inﬂation Z
q
t31,a n dl a g g e d
output gap y
q
t31, measured as in section 2, on the basis of the ”Lags and Forecasts” speci-




I start by calculating expected inﬂation shock variable Et0
q
t+3. I estimate the forecast
Phillip’s curve, analogous to equation (1), but using EtZ
q
t+3 as a dependent variable, and
assume that a residual term reﬂects expectations of the shock, which are not related to
developments in lagged fundamentals.












2 =0 .72 (5)
Note that the coecient on lagged inﬂation is very close to 1, and that the coecient
on lagged output gap is 0.34, corresponding to a sacriﬁce ratio of 3 (output gap of 3p e r
cent, in absence of shocks, causes a 1 per cent decrease in inﬂation), which is close to the
estimates reported by Mankiw (1997) and Sachs (1985), — 2.8a n d2 .9 respectively.
Next, I deﬁne Et0
q











Figure 2 demonstrates the magnitude of these shocks. Most of the time, they are small,
with a standard deviation of 0.48. There are, however, several points where the expected
shock reaches levels of 1 per cent and higher, particularly in the second half of 1987, in
1988.2, and in 1992.2. Those moments will be discussed later on, in section 4.



























31 ¯ R2 =0 .84;SSR =2 4 .58
Inclusion of the expected inﬂation shock does improve the results, increasing the ﬁta n d
lowering the sum of squared residuals. The digerence between the coecients on lagged
inﬂation and expected inﬂation shock is close to 1, as the model predicts.
T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h ee x p e c t e di n ﬂation shock in the estimated rule serves as evidence
that the Fed’s policy is forward-looking, a factor ignored by the traditional Taylor rule. It
suggests that instead of responding to events only after they have occurred, the Fed does take
into account expected developments — the respective monetary policy is, in fact, designed to
preempt rather than just react.
Note that the inﬂation coecient is still estimated to be higher than the usually suggested
values. In fact, Orphanides (1998a) reports an almost identical coecient of 2.51 when
substituting third quarter horizon inﬂation and output gap forecasts into the rule.
Estimates of the response parameters can also be used to estimate implied values for the
real interest rate and inﬂation targets. Tchaidze (2001) calculates those according to the
following formulas:
b ZW =
rW  b C
c CZ
b rW = b C + c CZZ
W
6Standard errors in the forward-looking speciﬁcation are calculated according to methodology described
in Pagan (1984).
15where b C and c CZ are estimates of the constant and the inﬂation response in correspondence
with the Taylor rule.
An assumption about one of the targets allows to calculate the value for the other. Taylor
(1993) suggests a 2 per cent target for both variables. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) argue
that under certain circumstances, average values may signal policy makers’ intentions.
Assuming rW at a 2.00 level suggests ZW equal to 3.22, while assuming rW equal to the
sample’s average7 of 2.48 suggests ZW of 3.61.
Likewise, assuming ZW to be equal to 2.00 produces rW of 0.47, which is unrealistically
l o w .A tt h es a m et i m e ,a s s u m i n gZW to be equal to the sample’s average of 3.48, results in
rW equal to 2.32.
These calculations suggest that, while assumption of a real interest rate target of 2.02.3
per cent may seem sensible, an appropriate value for the inﬂation would be much higher, at
around 3.23.5 per cent. That transforms into a 5.25.8% target for the nominal interest
rate, while an average over the sample is 5.97%.
4 Historical Evidence
In this section I present some evidence from various historical records. These are consistent
with my estimates of expected shocks and conﬁrm the behavior of the Fed suggested by the
results of the previous section.
7Average inﬂation and real interest rate are calculated using revised data.
164.1 Expected Inﬂation Shocks
Figure 3 shows the actual path for the Federal Funds Rate as well as the ﬁtted values based
on the regressions with and without inﬂation shock included among the regressors. Most of
t h et i m e ,t h ed i gerence between the two ﬁtted series is not large, although inclusion of the
shock seems to bring the series suggested by the rule closer to the actual path.
There are, however, several points where there is a substantial digerence (about 1 per
cent and even more) between the backward-looking rule and the actual path of the interest
rate, whereas the digerence between the forward-looking rule and the actual path is much
lower. These divergences are caused by the high values of expected inﬂation shock (see ﬁgure
2).
In particular, notice the digerence between the two rules in 1987.3 and 1987.4, when
the values suggested by the backward rule are 6.07% and 5.49% respectively, corresponding
values for the forward-looking rule are 7.03% and 6.76%, and the actual values are 6.84%
a n d6 . 9 2 % . S u c had i gerence is caused by a sharp increase in inﬂationary expectations.
The Economic Report of the President (1988 p. 28, 38-39) cites a ”potential for greater
inﬂation, associated in part with weakness of the dollar” and in part with the ﬂaring up
inﬂation expectations as the basis for such tightening. The ERP explicitly points out that
such policy was desirable in order to avoid inevitable inﬂationary expectations: ”With output
growth apparently well-maintained and inﬂation expectations building at times, the Federal
Reserve acted to forestall a resurgence of deep-rooted inﬂation and to retain hard-won gains
towards price stability.”
17Less than a year later, in 1988.2 and 1988.3, there was another peak in expected inﬂation
shock, which causes another divergence between the two rules. This peak reﬂects upward
pressure created by the excessive liquidity pumped into the economy following the October
1987 stock market crash. Later on, the Fed had to reverse its policy and tighten as it
became ”evident that the stock market crash would not seriously agect spending growth”
(ERP, 1989, p.280).
Finally, the last peak in inﬂation expectations of 1992.2 seems to reﬂect a producer price
inﬂation rebounce, unusually low throughout 1991 as a result of declining oil prices from
their peak during the Gulf conﬂict in 1990.3 (ERP, 1993 p.47).
4.2 Expected Output Gap Shocks. The Last Piece of a Puzzle?
As ﬁgure 3 shows, inclusion of the expected inﬂation shock does not explain all of the
movements of the Federal Funds Rate. In particular, from 1988.3 through 1989.1, the actual
monetary policy was much tighter than the rule suggests (the digerences are 1.36%, 1.52%
and 1.38%), while in 1989.2 and from 1993.2 through 1994.1, the rule prescribes an interest
rate about 1% higher than the actual one.
As equation (4) suggests, the digerence may be explained by expected output gap shocks.
As discussed on page 12, these could not be retrieved from the Greenbook forecasts, and
thus are omitted when doing empirical estimations. However, equation (4) suggests that
residuals from estimation of the forward-looking speciﬁcation of the rule (as in section 3),
are proportional to the expected output gap shock, as they are given by q
31Et#
q
+3,w h e r eq
18is a parameter of the IS curve (2) that reﬂects the sensitivity of output gap with respect to















and plot this variable on ﬁgure 4.
A much tighter policy than the one suggested by the rule from 1988.3 through 1989.1
is translated into an excess demand, something conﬁrmed by the Economic Report of the
President (1989, p.275), which cites unusually rapid growth in producers’ investments in
durable equipment, and in the dollar’s real depreciation, which made US produced goods
more competitive on the international markets.
Likewise, ﬁgure 4 suggests expected declines in output in 1989.2 and from 1993.2 through
1994.1, for which the rule prescribes an interest rate about 1% higher than the actual one.
Ic o u l dn o tﬁnd, however, explicit conﬁrmations of such beliefs, which means that other
factors (such as, for example, exogenous shifts in policy makers’ preferences) may have been
at play.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This study incorporates information contained in the Greenbook forecasts into evaluating
the Greenspan era Taylor rule. This is done in two ways.
First, forecasts help to improve the estimates of policy makers’ real-time beliefs about the
state of the economy. Second, they allow the retrieval of the Fed’s expectations concerning
19future inﬂationary developments.
These expectations are signiﬁcantly present in the Taylor rule, which indicates that mon-
etary policy making is not as myopic as might be inferred from a class of simple backward-
looking policy rules. Apart from responding to inertial components of fundamentals, such
as inﬂation and output gap, the Federal Reserve takes into account future inﬂation shocks
in a way consistent with the optimal behavior suggested by a simple two-equation model.
Together, these three variables explain about 90 per cent of the movements in the Federal
Funds Rate. The remaining 10 per cent may represent expected output gap shocks, which
could not be recovered from the Greenbook forecasts.
Finally, this paper conﬁrms the hawkishness of Greenspan’s Fed. This is reﬂected in the
inﬂation response coecient of 2.52, which is much higher than the usually suggested values.
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Figure 1: Output Gap Estimates






































Figure 2: Expected t +3I n ﬂation Shock as of t




























































































































































































Actual Fitted with a Shock Fitted without a Shock
Figure 3: FFR: Actual and Fitted Values





































Figure 4: Expected t + 3 Output Gap ”Shock” as of t
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